Originalism, however, has gained wider acceptance across the ideological spectrum. For instance, during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for his failed nomination to the Supreme Court (1987), Robert Bork’s originalism was a primary point of attack. Originalism initially came under significant attack and was dismissed as the position of disaffected conservatives. Ultimately for Meese, originalism seemed to be the only way to reconcile judicial power with principles of self-government. The Constitution, according to originalists like Meese, is a contract whose terms cannot be redefined except through the amendment process. In this speech, Meese looked at several areas of constitutional law such as federalism, criminal law, and religion where he thought the Court had abandoned the original understanding of the Constitution. Meese argued for what he called a Jurisprudence of Original Intention that would bind judges to the original meaning of the text-what the words meant when they were written. Connecticut (1965), had announced previously unrecognized rights such as a general right to privacy because “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”įor Meese, this kind of reasoning simply allowed justices to do what Brutus had predicted they would do: interpret the Constitution according to its “spirit” rather than its actual text. Dulles (1958) that when interpreting the Eighth Amendment justices “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Other justices, such as William O. William Brennan (1906–1997), who came to be one of Meese’s harshest critics, had, for instance, said in his opinion in Trop v.
EDWIN MEESE US ATTORNEYS GENERAL SERIES
In a series of three speeches, Ronald Reagan’s attorney general, Edwin Meese (1931– ), helped launch the “originalism revolution.” During the Warren Court era (1953–1969), justices had increasingly argued for a “living” approach to constitutional interpretation.
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